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Quadratic Gaussian Privacy Games
Farhad Farokhi, Henrik Sandberg, Iman Shames, and Michael Cantoni
Abstract—A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of
privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised.
In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measure-
ment of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private
information (which is correlated with the state) private from
a malicious agent that may eavesdrop on its communications
with the receiver. A family of nontrivial equilibria, in which
the communicated messages carry information, is constructed
and its properties are studied.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern infrastructures, such as smart grids and intelligent
transportation systems, are typically composed of smaller
entities that cooperate in providing services whilst competing
to generate revenue. These entities wish to retain a certain
level of autonomy and privacy, which renders the task of
guaranteeing a reasonable level of performance arduous. A
new framework is required for modelling, understanding, and
mitigating the challenges arising from the need for privacy
and autonomy. To this aim, in this paper, we develop a game-
theoretic setup for modelling and analysing the effects of
privacy on strategic1 communication.
Specifically, we consider strategic communication between
a sender and a receiver when a malicious agent can eavesdrop
on their transmitted messages. The sender has the inten-
tion to provide accurate measurements of the state to the
receiver, however, at the same time, it would like to hide its
private information (which is correlated to the state-to-be-
estimated) from the malicious agent2. We present a game-
theoretic framework for modelling the interaction between
these agents. Subsequently, we define an equilibrium as a
tuple of policies from which no one has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate. We study the properties of the equilib-
rium as function of the privacy ratio, a parameter that reflects
the balance between the sender’s intention for providing an
accurate measurement of the state to the receiver and its
desire for privacy against the malicious agent.
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1The term “strategic” in “strategic communication” refers to that the
participants (the sender, the receiver, the eavesdropper, etc) can identify
their objectives and find the best policy for achieving these objectives in
response to the actions of the other parties.
2Note that the receiver and the malicious agent need not be separate
entities. For instance, in many cases, we would like to provide some
information to for-profit organizations in return for services, however, we
wish to retain the rest of our personal data private to avoid being scammed
through, among various means, targeted advertisement.
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Fig. 1. The communication structure between the strategic sensor S, other
sources of information z, the malicious agent M , and the receiver R.
The problem that is considered in this paper is partly
related to studies in differential privacy and its application in
control and estimation [1]–[4]. In those studies, the commu-
nicated messages are typically perturbed by noise to ensure
differential privacy. In this paper, we take a completely
different approach to model and to understand the balance
between privacy and the underlying objective of communica-
tion, that is, providing useful information to a less-informed
third party. This framework results in different insights. For
instance, in turns out that, in some cases, we do not need to
add noise to the communicated signals at the equilibrium
of the introduced privacy game. Furthermore, this paper
provides an average-type privacy whereas the approach in
the differential privacy literature gives a worst-case analysis
(using information-theoretic tools one can bound the amount
of the total leaked information).
We should note that the model and the results in this paper
are, particularly, related to the cheap-talk literature [5]–[7].
A cheap-talk game is a strategic communication game in
which well-informed players transmits messages to a receiver
that makes a final decision regarding social welfare of all
the players. Recently, these results were utilized in [8] to
develop a framework for strategic communication between
self-interested sensors and an estimator. In this paper, we
utilize those ideas to develop a specific family of cheap-talk
games in which the conflict-of-interest between sensors and
the receiver is caused by the desire for privacy. Subsequently,
this family of games is analysed using the tools developed
in [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the privacy game and define the equilibrium
for the game. We determine a family of equilibria and study
its properties in Section III. Finally, we present a numerical
example in Section IV and conclude the paper in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the communication structure (see Fig. 1) in
which a sender S transmits a message y ∈ Rny over a real
channel to a receiver R. The sender has the best intention
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to provide an accurate measurement of a variable x ∈ Rnx
to the receiver. However, it also wishes to keep its private
information w ∈ Rnw hidden from any malicious agent
who can tap the channel and eavesdrop on its transmitted
message. This is certainly not a trivial task if x and w are
correlated (as, in such cases, measurements of x carry “some
information” about the realization of w). We also assume
that the receiver and the malicious agent can, in addition to
the message provided by the sender, access other sources
of information (e.g., other senders, physical sensors, etc) to
receive the measurement z ∈ Rnz . Throughout the paper, we
use the notation Vxy to denote E{xy>} for any two random
variables x and y. We make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1: x,w, z are jointly distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and a positive-definite joint
covariance matrix.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the random
variables x,w, z are realized. Then, the sender determines
and transmits its message y. Note that, at this point, we
assume that the sender has access to the realization of z,
however, as will see, at the equilibrium, the sender does not
utilize the realization (but uses the probability distribution).
Subsequently, the receiver constructs its best estimate of the
state x. At the same time, a malicious agent constructs the
best estimate of the private information w of the sender
from the available information y and z. Finally, all the cost
functions are realized. Note that all the distributions are
assumed to be common knowledge in the game (i.e., each
player knows them, each player knows that the other players
know them, and so on). Let us introduce each player in the
game properly.
A. Receiver
The receiver constructs its best estimate of the state,
denoted by xˆ ∈ Rnx according to the conditional probability
density distribution ψ(·|y, z). Therefore, for all Lebesgue-
measurable sets X ⊆ Rnx , we have
P{xˆ ∈ X |y, z} =
∫
ξ∈X
ψ(ξ|y, z)dξ.
Let Ψ denote the set of all such conditional probability den-
sity distributions (i.e., the set of all non-negative Lebesgue-
measurable functions with integral over Rnx equal to one).
The receiver is interested in having a small estimation error
for the state E{‖x− xˆ‖22}.
B. Malicious Agent
The malicious agent constructs its best estimate wˆ ac-
cording to the conditional probability density distribution
φ(·|y, z). Therefore, similarly, for all Lebesgue-measurable
sets W ⊆ Rnw , we get
P{wˆ ∈ W|y, z} =
∫
ξ∈W
φ(ξ|y, z)dξ.
The set of all such conditional distributions is denoted by
Φ. What distinguishes the sets Ψ and Φ is the dimensions
of the vectors xˆ and wˆ. The cost function of the malicious
agent is E{‖w − wˆ‖22}.
C. Sender
The sender employs a conditional probability density
distribution γ(·|x,w) for all x ∈ Rnx and w ∈ Rnw , which
gives that
P{y ∈ Y|x,w} =
∫
ξ∈Y
γ(ξ|x,w)dξ,
where Y ⊆ Rny is any Lebesgue-measurable set. The set
of all such conditional probability density distributions is
denoted by Γ. The cost of the sender is E{‖x − xˆ‖22} −
δE{‖w − wˆ‖22}, where δ ∈ R≥0 is the privacy ratio. As
δ increases, the sender puts more emphasis on keeping its
privacy instead of helping the receiver by proving a useful
message for the state estimation to the receiver.
D. Equilibrium
With these definitions at hand, we are now ready to define
the equilibrium of the game. However, first, we need to define
some useful notations. In that what follows, we use ΨΓ and
ΦΓ to denote the sets of all mappings from Γ to, respectively,
Ψ and Φ. Hence, for any ψ ∈ ΨΓ and any given γ, ψ(γ) is a
conditional probability density distribution in Ψ. We use the
notation [ψ(γ)](xˆ|y, z) to distinguish between the arguments
of ψ and ψ(γ). The same can be said about the entries of
ΦΓ.
DEFINITION 1: A tuple (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) ∈ ΨΓ × ΦΓ × Γ is
an equilibrium of the privacy game with privacy ratio δ if
ψ∗ ∈ arg min
ψ∈ΨΓ
E
{∫
xˆ∈Rnx
∫
y∈Rny
‖x− xˆ‖22[ψ(γ∗)](xˆ|y, z)
× γ∗(y|x,w)dydxˆ
}
, (1a)
φ∗ ∈ arg min
φ∈ΦΓ
E
{∫
wˆ∈Rnw
∫
y∈Rny
‖w − wˆ‖22[φ(γ∗)](wˆ|y, z)
× γ∗(y|x,w)dydwˆ
}
, (1b)
γ∗ ∈ arg min
γ∈Γ
E
{∫
xˆ∈Rnx
∫
y∈Rny
‖x− xˆ‖22[ψ∗(γ)](xˆ|y, z)
× γ(y|x,w)dydxˆ
− δ
∫
wˆ∈Rnw
∫
y∈Rny
‖w − wˆ‖22[φ∗(γ)](wˆ|y, z)
× γ(y|x,w)dydwˆ
}
. (1c)
In some cases, the policies of the malicious agent and
the receiver are set by the same entity. For instance, we may
want to provide some information to a for-profit organization
in return for services, however, we wish to retain the rest of
our personal data private to avoid being scammed through
targeted advertisement from the same organization. The
following definition capture such scenarios.
DEFINITION 2: A tuple (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) ∈ ΨΓ × ΦΓ × Γ is
an equilibrium of the privacy game with privacy ratio δ if
γ∗ satisfies (1c) and
(ψ∗, φ∗) ∈ arg min
(ψ,φ)∈ΨΓ×ΦΓ
E
{∫
xˆ∈Rnx
∫
y∈Rny
‖x− xˆ‖22[ψ(γ∗)](xˆ|y, z)
× γ∗(y|x,w)dydxˆ
+ ϑ
∫
wˆ∈Rnw
∫
y∈Rny
‖w − wˆ‖22[φ(γ∗)](wˆ|y, z)
× γ∗(y|x,w)dydwˆ
}
(2)
for a given constant ϑ > 0.
THEOREM 1: A tuple (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) ∈ ΨΓ × ΦΓ × Γ is an
equilibrium of the privacy game with privacy ratio δ in the
sense of Definition 2 if and only if it is an equilibrium in
the sense of Definition 1.
Proof: The first term under expectation in (2) is only
a function of ψ and the second term is only a function of
φ. Therefore, we can separate this optimization problem into
two parts as in (1a) and (1b).
Theorem 1 shows that there is no loss of generality in
assuming that the receiver and the malicious agent are two
separate entities as in Definition 1.
REMARK 1: The equilibrium in Definition 2 (and equiva-
lently that of Definition 1) is a Stackelberg equilibrium rather
than a Nash equilibrium. This is because, in the definition
of a Nash equilibrium, the players are not allowed to change
their policy (they select one and fix it in response to all that
the others can do). However, in this definition, clearly, both
the receiver and the malicious agent are able to set their
policies (i.e. estimate generating conditional densities ψ(γ)
and φ(γ)) in response to the selected policy of the sender γ.
In the next section, we construct a family of privacy-game
equilibria.
III. MAIN RESULTS
As any other cheap-talk game, this game posses an array
of non-informative trivial equilibria, which are known as
babbling equilibria in the economics literature [6]. The next
theorem constructs these babbling equilibria in the privacy
game in line with Definition 1.
THEOREM 2: Let γ∗(y|x,w) = ρy(y), where ρy(·) is an
arbitrary probability density distribution. Moreover, let ψ∗
and φ∗ be, respectively, selected such that xˆ = E{x|z}
and wˆ = E{w|z} almost surely. Then, (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) is an
equilibrium of the privacy game with any privacy ratio.
Proof: Since the sender does not provide any viable
information about the state-to-be-estimated and so y and x
are statistically independent, the best policy of the receiver
and the malicious agent is to ignore the message y. Similarly,
if the receiver and the malicious agent are ignoring the
sender’s message, its cost function does not change by the
choice of its policy (i.e., the conditional density function for
selecting its message) and so it might as well not provide
any viable information.
At these equilibria, all the players purely randomize and
disregard all the available information to them. We are not
interested in any of these equilibria. In the next theorem, we
construct a nontrivial equilibrium for the privacy game.
THEOREM 3: For any δ ∈ R≥0, there exists an equilib-
rium (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) ∈ ΨΓ × ΦΓ × Γ in which
i) The receiver employs the policy ψ∗ such that
P
{
xˆ =
[
Vxy Vxz
] [ Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
]}
= 1;
ii) The malicious agent employs the policy φ∗ such that
P
{
wˆ =
[
Vwy Vwz
] [ Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
]}
= 1;
iii) The sender employs the policy γ∗ such that
y = K∗xx+K
∗
ww + v,
where[
K∗>x
K∗>w
]
∈ arg min
K>∈R(nx+ny)×ny
Tr
(
KΞ
[ −I 0
0 δI
]
ΞK>
)
,
s.t. KΞK> ≤ I,
with
Ξ =
[
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
−
[
Vxz
Vwz
]>
V −1zz
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
,
and v ∈ Rn is a Gaussian random variable independent
of x,w, z with zero mean and variance
Vvv = I −
[
K∗x K
∗
w
]
Ξ
[
K∗>x
K∗>w
]
.
Furthermore, for all κ ∈ Rny×ny such that det(κ) 6= 0,
(ψ∗, φ∗, κγ∗) constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof: First, we fix ψ∗ and φ∗ as in the statement of the
theorem and show that the presented γ∗ is the best response
of the sender. Let us assume that Vyy − VyzV −1zz Vzy = I .
This is without loss of generality as the receiver can always
scale the communicated message to ensure this is satisfied.
To show this, assume that Vyy − VyzV −1zz Vzy = D ∈ Sny++,
where Sny++ denotes the set of positive-definite matrix in
Rny×ny . Note that Vyy − VyzV −1zz Vzy ∈ Sny++ follows from
Schur complement and Assumption 1. Now, the receiver can
simply use y˜ = D−1/2y, which gives Vy˜y˜ − Vy˜zV −1zz Vzy˜ =
D−1/2DD−1/2 = I . (Since the transformation between y
and y˜ is one-to-one, it does not create any information loss.)
Under this assumption, using the matrix inversion lemma,
we get[
Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1
=
[
I −VyzV −1zz
−V −1zz Vzy V −1zz VzyVyzV −1zz + V −1zz
]
.
E{‖x− xˆ‖2} − δE{‖w − wˆ‖2} = Tr(Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx)− δTr(Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw)
+ Tr

 VxyVwy
Vzy
>  −I 0 VxzV −1zz0 δI −δVwzV −1zz
V −1zz Vzx −δV −1zz Vzw −V −1zz (VzxVxz − δVzwVwz)V −1zz
 VxyVwy
Vzy

 . (3)
Note that
E{‖x− xˆ‖2}
= E
{∥∥∥∥x− [ Vxy Vxz ] [ Vyy VyzVzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
] ∥∥∥∥
2
}
= Tr
(
Vxx−
[
Vxy Vxz
][ Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1[
Vyx
Vzx
])
= Tr(Vxx − VxyVyx + VxyVyzV −1zz Vzx + VxzV −1zz VzyVyx
− Vxz(V −1zz VzyVyzV −1zz + V −1zz )Vzx)
= Tr(Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx)+Tr(−VyxVxy + VyzV −1zz VzxVxy
+ VyxVxzV
−1
zz Vzy − VyzV −1zz VzxVxzV −1zz Vzy).
Similarly, we have
E{‖w − wˆ‖2}
= E
{∥∥∥∥w − [ Vwy Vwz ] [ Vyy VyzVzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
] ∥∥∥∥
2
}
= Tr(Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw) + Tr(−VywVwy
+ VyzV
−1
zz VzwVwy + VywVwzV
−1
zz Vzy
− VyzV −1zz VzwVwzV −1zz Vzy).
Therefore, we get the equality in (3) on top of the page.
Notice that, in this cost function, we have −I 0 VxzV −1zz0 δI δVwzV −1zz
V −1zz Vzx δV
−1
zz Vzw −V −1zz (VzxVxz − δVzwVwz)V −1zz

=
[
I 0 −VxzV −1zz
0 I −VwzV −1zz
]>[ −I 0
0 δI
][
I 0 −VxzV −1zz
0 I −VwzV −1zz
]
.
Let us call this matrix Z. Moreover, we have
E


y
x
w
z


y
x
w
z

>=

Vyy Vyx Vyw Vyz
Vxy Vxx Vxw Vxz
Vwy Vwx Vww Vwz
Vzy Vzx Vzw Vzz
≥0.
(4)
Using Schur complement, the inequality in (4) can be rewrit-
ten as
Vyy −
 VxyVwy
Vzy
>  Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
−1  VxyVwy
Vzy
 ≥ 0.
(5)
Recalling that Vyy − VyzV −1zz Vzy = I , the inequality in (5)
can be posed as
I−
 VxyVwy
Vzy
> 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 V −1zz

+
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
−1

 VxyVwy
Vzy
 ≥ 0. (6)
Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.2
in [9], we can show that the inequality in (6) holds if and
only if  VxyVwy
Vzy
>Q
 VxyVwy
Vzy
 ≤ I,
where
Q =
[
I 0 −VxzV −1zz
0 I −VwzV −1zz
]>
×
([
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
−
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
V −1zz
[
Vxz
Vwz
])−1
×
[
I 0 −VxzV −1zz
0 I −VwzV −1zz
]
.
Thus, the best response of the sender is given by solving the
optimization problem
min
Vxy,Vwy,Vzy
Tr

 VxyVwy
Vzy
> Z
 VxyVwy
Vzy

 (7a)
s.t.
 VxyVwy
Vzy
>Q
 VxyVwy
Vzy
 ≤ I. (7b)
It remains to show that an affine policy can be optimal in
this sense. Let
y = Kxx+Kww +Kzz + v,
where v is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable, which is
independent of x,w, z. Simple calculations show that VxyVwy
Vzy
 =
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
 K>xK>w
K>z
 ,
and, as a result, K>xK>w
K>z
 =
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
−1  VxyVwy
Vzy
 ,
where the inverse exists thanks to Assumption 1. Introducing
the change of variable
ξ =
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
−1  VxyVwy
Vzy

in (7) yields the equivalent optimization problem
X = arg min
ξ∈R(nx+ny+nz)×ny
Tr
(
ξ>Z ′ξ
)
(8a)
s.t. ξ>Q′ξ ≤ I, (8b)
where
Z ′ =
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
Z
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz

= W>
[ −I 0
0 δI
]
W
and
Q′ =
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz
Q
 Vxx Vxw VxzVwx Vww Vwz
Vzx Vzw Vzz

= W>
([
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
−
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
V −1zz
[
Vxz
Vwz
])−1
W
with
W =
[
Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx Vxw − VxzV −1zz Vzw 0
Vwx − VwzV −1zz Vzx Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw 0
]
.
Let us define
X ′ = arg min
ξ′∈R(nx+ny)×ny
Tr
(
ξ
′>Z ′′ξ′
)
(9a)
s.t. ξ
′>Q′′ξ′ ≤ I, (9b)
where
Z ′′ =
[
Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx Vxw − VxzV −1zz Vzw
Vwx − VwzV −1zz Vzx Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw
]
×
[ −I 0
0 δI
]
×
[
Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx Vxw − VxzV −1zz Vzw
Vwx − VwzV −1zz Vzx Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw
]
and
Q′′ =
[
Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx Vxw − VxzV −1zz Vzw
Vwx − VwzV −1zz Vzx Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw
]
×
([
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
−
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
V −1zz
[
Vxz
Vwz
])−1
×
[
Vxx − VxzV −1zz Vzx Vxw − VxzV −1zz Vzw
Vwx − VwzV −1zz Vzx Vww − VwzV −1zz Vzw
]
=
[
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
−
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
V −1zz
[
Vxz
Vwz
]
.
Evidently, {[
ξ′
0nz×ny
] ∣∣∣∣ξ′ ∈ X ′} ⊆ X ,
because
ξ
′>Z ′′ξ′ =
[
ξ′
ξ′′
]
Z ′
[
ξ′
ξ′′
]
,
ξ
′>Q′′ξ′ =
[
ξ′
ξ′′
]
Q′
[
ξ′
ξ′′
]
,
for all ξ′′ ∈ Rnz×ny . Hence, there is an equilibrium for
which Kz = 0 because X ′ 6= ∅ (as its cost function is
continuous and the feasible set is compact). The rest of
the proof follows easily from the fact that once we use the
sender’s strategy in the statement of theorem (which is an
affine function in the realization of the random variables
x,w), the best estimator that the receiver and the malicious
agent can utilize is the least mean square estimator in the
statement of the theorem.
REMARK 2: Note that the policies ψ∗ and φ∗ at the
equilibrium constructed in Theorem 3 are affine in the
realizations of the random variables y and z. However, these
policies are overall not affine as Vxy , Vxz , Vyz , Vyy, and Vzz
are all functions of the distributions of the random variables
z and y (albeit not their realizations). This also shows that
ψ∗ and φ∗, at the equilibrium, are functions of γ (i.e., the
policy of the sender).
Solving the optimization problem in Theorem 3 is a
tedious task even numerically as the problem is not convex.
Note that since we are interested in finding an equilib-
rium, approximations are not particularly useful (since, at
an approximate solution, an agent might have an incentive
to unilaterally change its policy and, thus, the equilibrium
breaks down). In such cases, the definition of the equilibrium
should be adapted accordingly. This problem can be an
avenue for future research. In the next corollary, we focus
on the case where we can solve this optimization problem
explicitly.
COROLLARY 4: Let ny = 1. For any δ ∈ R≥0, there
exists an equilibrium (ψ∗, φ∗, γ∗) ∈ ΨΓ ×ΦΓ × Γ in which
i) The receiver employs the policy ψ∗ such that
P
{
xˆ =
[
Vxy Vxz
] [ Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
]}
= 1;
ii) The malicious agent employs the policy φ∗ such that
P
{
wˆ =
[
Vwy Vwz
] [ Vyy Vyz
Vzy Vzz
]−1 [
y
z
]}
= 1;
iii) The sender employs the policy γ∗ such that
P{y = K∗xx+K∗ww} = 1,
where [
Kx
Kw
]
= Ξ−1/2ξ
with ξ being the normalized eigenvector corresponding
to the smallest eigenvalue of Ξ1/2 diag(−I, δI)Ξ1/2.
Furthermore, for all κ 6= 0, (ψ∗, φ∗, κγ∗) constitutes an
equilibrium.
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Fig. 2. Estimation error of the receiver and the malicious agent as a
function of the privacy ratio.
Proof: The proof follows from applying Lemma A.1
in [9] to the results of Theorem 3.
REMARK 3: Corollary 4 shows the maybe surprising fact
that the privacy-preserving policy of the sender at the calcu-
lated family of equilibria is deterministic if the message from
the sender is scalar, i.e., ny = 1. It should be noted that the
equilibrium in this game is not necessarily unique. Therefore,
there might exist an equilibrium (in addition to the babbling
equilibria; see Theorem 2) that consists of randomization.
Unfortunately, for the rest of the cases, there is no systematic
way to construct an explicit policy for the sender at the
equilibrium.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Let us consider the case where there is no side information.
Set nx = nw = ny = 1 and fix[
Vxx Vxw
Vwx Vww
]
=
[
1 0.8
0.8 1
]
.
Fig. 2 shows the estimation error of the receiver and the
malicious agent at the calculated equilibrium with κ = 1
as a function of the privacy ratio δ. Indeed, as the privacy
ratio δ increases, the estimation error of the malicious agent
increases and, finally, converges to Vww. Therefore, the
sender keeps w completely private. However, this happens
at the price of a larger estimation error of the state at the
receiver.
Fig. 3 illustrates the estimation error at the receiver E{‖x−
xˆ‖22} as a function of the privacy ratio δ and the correlation
between the state and the private information captured by
Vxw. For a fixed privacy ratio, as we increase Vxw the quality
of the estimation degrades since if the correlation is high
an accurate measurement of x conveys a lot of information
about the realization of w.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A game-theoretic framework for modelling and analysing
the effect of privacy in strategic communication between var-
Vxw
δ
E{‖x− xˆ‖2
2
}
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Fig. 3. Estimation error of the receiver as a function of the privacy ratio
and the correlation between the state and the private information.
ious entities is developed. A well-informed sender wants to
provide an accurate measurement of the state-to-be-estimated
to a receiver. However, the sender also desires to keep
its private information private from a malicious agent. The
private information and the state are assumed to be correlated
and, hence, an accurate measurement of the state also shines
some light on the realization of the private information. The
trade-off between the desire to keep privacy and transmitting
a useful measurement to the receiver is captured using the
privacy ratio. For scalar messages, the policy of the sender, at
the calculated equilibrium, is deterministic. A viable avenue
for future work is to extend the setup to more than one
sender.
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